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Towards a professional army 
Changes to the structure of the officer cadre 
and the manning system of the Russian Armed Forces
Andrzej Wilk
The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major 
transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a down-
sized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becom-
ing a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on 
a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a contin-
ued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of profes-
sionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number 
of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment 
of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the 
officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based 
predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these 
changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces 
should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by 
global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could 
still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, 
most of them conscripts.
A professional army as an attribute of a global power
As the Cold War ended, it became much less important for European countries to maintain 
mass armies and related systems for universal mobilisation in the event of war. At the same 
time, defence solutions such as these have become less popular with the public. This phenom-
enon has also affected Russia. In itself, major structural changes to the Russian army were 
not required; it sufficed to downsize the Armed Forces by reducing the number of conscripts 
drafted into compulsory military service. However, the global social and political chang-
es coincided with the rapid development of microelectronics, leading to the emergence of 
a new generation of tools and methods of combat. The considerably higher costs of acquiring 
the new generation of weapons and military equipment, combined with the longer training 
periods needed for soldiers to learn how to use them, created a need for soldiers with better 
qualifications, and especially better technical knowledge; as a result, the professionalisation 
of most modern-day armies has become inevitable.
Compared to the armies of the leading Western powers, the Russian Armed Forces con-
tinued for a relatively long time to operate within the mass-army structures inherited from 
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the Soviet Union. Financial constraints were the main reason for this. The Russian army’s 
arsenal included relatively few state-of-the-art, complex means of combat, which it could 
not afford; professionalisation was thus not an urgent necessity. Professionalisation was 
also opposed by some of the commanders, in particular those responsible for the Russian 
forces’ extensive backup units; this was the part of the army which prospered most in 
post-Soviet circumstances, and for whom the conscripts were mainly a pool of free labour. 
The progressing growth, in nominal and real terms, of military spending (from US$6 billion 
in 2000 to US$60 billion in 20111) provided the basis for modernising the Russian army 
and, as a result, led to a confrontation between those who favoured keeping the old order 
in place and the advocates of change, representing the new generation of Russian mili-
tary who had earned their stripes as officers in the latter period of the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan, or even after the break-up of the USSR. The Russian leadership, which per-
ceived the armed forces as Russia’s main attribute as a world power and therefore wanted 
them modernised, ultimately sided with those who advocated professionalisation.
Professionalisation of the army should be regarded as an element of the broader efforts 
Russia has undertaken to restore its dominant position in the post-Soviet space (the Com-
monwealth of Independent States area) and its status as a global power. Because of the 
transformations that the leading Western armies underwent in the last years of the 20th 
century and at the beginning of the 21st century (the US and British armies had become 
professional even before the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent technological devel-
opments only consolidated the changes), Russia was in fact forced to follow suit in order to 
keep its status as one of the world’s leading military powers.
Personnel transformations proving the end of the mass army
In the period from 2008 to 2011, the structure of the officer cadre of the Russian Armed 
Forces changed radically. The cadre’s size was cut from the original 355,000 posts to 
220,000 posts (while in fact only 150,000 original posts were kept in place; the re-
maining 70,000 will be new posts in the so-called Aerospace Defence Forces to be cre-
ated to 2016)2. Most of those dismissed from active service were officers serving in the 
backup units and in the central command and control structures of the Ministry of Defence. 
As a result, the structure of the officer cadre regained its traditional proportions, with the 
lowest officer ranks of lieutenants and senior lieutenants accounting for the largest number 
of posts (before the changes, senior of-
ficers at the ranks of lieutenant colonel 
and major were the most numerous, ac-
counting for more than half of all posts; 
see Appendix). At the same time as the of-
ficer cadre was downsized, recruitment to 
officer schools was temporarily suspend-
ed, and the number of military universities was reduced six-fold; the remaining ten universi-
ties will resume recruitment on a much smaller scale this summer. In 2012, officer schools 
will admit around 8,000 new students (before 2008, they admitted 25,000–30,000 each 
year)3; if the trend continues as planned, this will mean that the target number of officers 
in the Russian army will stabilise at around 200,000. Stricter criteria for promotion have 
also been implemented, which has resulted in a significant improvement of the quality 
of the cadre. An elite system of military education is developing, and future servicemen 
can prepare for military service in cadet schools, which means that in future, graduates of 
these institutions will account for a majority of officers in Russia. The elitist nature of service 
in the officer cadre of the Russian Armed Forces is also emphasised by the considerable pay 
 
 
 
 
1 Figures based on data 
on expenses in the ‘National 
defence‘ chapters of federal 
budget bills (http://www1.
minfin.ru/ru/budget/federal_
budget) and information on 
Russian military spending 
published by SIPRI. According 
to SIPRI analysts, the Russian 
Federation’s military spending 
has increased by 82.4% 
in real terms between 2001 
and 2010. Table 4A.1, 
‘The 15 countries with the 
highest military expenditure 
in 2010’, SIPRI Yearbook 
2011, Oxford University 
Press 2011, p. 183.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Соотношение категорий 
воинских званий в структуре 
Вооруженных Сил до 
2008 года, Соотношения 
численности офицеров 
по штатно-должностным 
категориям. Presentation 
by the Chief of General Staff 
of the Russian Armed Forces, 
General Nikolai Makarov, 
Moscow, September 2011.
 
3 Interfax-AVN, TASS, 
20 February 2012.
Changes in the education system 
and considerable pay rises are mak-
ing the officer cadre of the Russian 
Armed Forces increasingly elitist.
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rises introduced in January 2012, whereby the original salaries were increased by two and 
a half times (after the changes, the lowest officer salaries now amount to around US$2,000 per 
month)4. Thus, the Russian army has become one of the best-paying employers in Russia, 
next to the energy sector5.
The most serious consequence of the downsizing and restructuring of the Russian army’s 
officer cadre is that the capacity for mass mobilisation has been reduced. According to the 
benchmarks in force before 2008, the Russian army had 1,350,000 posts (including around 
one million manned posts) in peacetime, and a capacity to increase its size to 4.2 mil-
lion soldiers through mobilisation in wartime6. With the new structure of the officer cadre, 
it will be possible to mobilise soldiers in numbers corresponding to not more than 30% of 
the peacetime force (1 million soldiers). A considerable expansion of the officer cadre in war-
time would require either a mobilisation of retired officers (unlikely and increasingly infeasible 
as time passes), or a larger number of new officers (the recruitment of which would take time, 
due to the nature of the training process, and would require a prior expansion of the train-
ing facilities). However, the mobilisation system has also been adapted to the new, smaller 
number of officers: it now envisages maintaining a limited number of reserve soldiers on pay, 
who are required to maintain an adequate level of training in the periods between their peri-
odic military exercises.
Essential changes to the army manning system
A mixed manning system based on contracts and conscription has been in place in the 
Russian army since the 1990s. Non-commissioned officer (NCO) posts requiring specialist 
training have been manned in the contract system since the beginning (until the first half 
of the 2000s, general military posts were not treated as such). Around 100,000 NCOs 
on contracts served mainly in backup units (medical, logistical, etc.). Line posts under 
senior NCOs (involving command of combat units) were usually manned by junior officers 
(typically reserve soldiers who had graduated from civilian universities, but also profes-
sional soldiers just out of military school, awaiting nominations to officer posts), where-
as the posts of junior non-commissioned officer were filled by conscripted soldiers. 
The first attempt at professionalising the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (limited 
to 81 first-line units) was made in the years 2004–2007. By 2008, around 100,000 new 
posts of contract NCOs and privates were created and maintained (out of a planned total 
of 125,400). However, the conditions of-
fered (in particular, lower-than-expected 
salaries and housing problems) impeded 
the continuation of this mode of recruit-
ment. The implementation of the next 
programme, which aimed at assigning 
contract soldiers to all non-commissioned 
officer posts in the Land Forces and the Navy, as well as the posts of sailors serving on 
warships (a total of 180,000 posts by 2015), was stopped when the structural and or-
ganisational transformation of the Russian army started in late 2008, and a large number 
of previously-created contract posts were re-manned with conscripted soldiers.
The above changes to the structure of the officer cadre contributed to the gradual disap-
pearance of the previously widespread practice of manning senior NCO posts with junior 
NCOs. Due to the character and duration of the training process (among other factors), 
this gap could not be filled with conscripted soldiers, and so it became necessary to create 
a professional cadre of NCOs in the Russian army. As the armed forces received more and 
more new-generation weapons and military equipment, it also became necessary to pay 
4 http://www.rg.ru/2011/12/08/
oklad-site-dok.html
5 Среднемесячная 
номинальная начисленная 
заработная плата работников 
организаций по видам 
экономической деятельности; 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/
connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/
main/population/wages/
6 ‘Укомплектованность 
Вооруженных Сил Российской 
Федерации до 2008 года.’ 
Presentation by the Chief 
of General Staff of the Russian 
Armed Forces, General Nikolai 
Makarov, Moscow, 
September 2011.
Officer corps have been downsized 
and restructured which has dimin-
ished the army’s ability to carry out 
mass mobilisation.
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more attention to the recruitment of professional privates. Starting from 2011, the creation 
of new contract posts resumed (thus de facto putting into practice the objectives of the 
2009–2015 programme). However, the recruitment procedures were changed (selected 
military academies launched courses for prospective contract NCOs, whereas previously 
it had sufficed to serve six months of compulsory military service to become a contract 
soldier), and a plan was announced to increase the number of contract posts in the Armed 
Forces to 425,000 in 20167, which largely confirmed the earlier projections.
The pay rises introduced as of January 2012 have been conducive to the achievement of those 
objectives, and have made their accomplishment highly likely. The lowest pay of a contract pri-
vate currently corresponds to US$850 per 
month, which is a strong motivating factor 
in the choice of a military career, especially 
in the poorer regions, considering the fact 
that the average salary in Russia is around 
US$600 per month8. Reports from the 
Russian regions since the end of January 
this year (i.e. since the first payment of the 
higher salaries) suggest that the number 
of applicants interested in contract military 
service has increased exponentially, and 
exceeds the current recruitment needs9. 
It is quite likely that around 50,000 new 
contract soldier posts will be created each year to 201610, especially considering the fact that 
during a similar period up to 2008, 25,000 new posts were manned each year, with much 
weaker incentives in place and despite frequent shortages of applicants. Moreover, the army 
has managed to keep 186,000 contract soldiers (figures of September 201111), even though 
large numbers of contract non-commissioned officers were dismissed from the dismantled 
backup units (as many as 60,000 ‘old-type’ NCOs on contracts could have left the service; 
just before the reform started, at the peak period in early 2009, the total number of contract 
soldiers in the Russian army had reached 207,000).
Smaller conscription of a new kind...
In 2008, the duration of compulsory military service in Russia was reduced to 12 months 
(from 24 months), which had the natural effect of doubling the number of enlisted con-
scripts (see Appendix). However, the peak lasted for only two years; the number of enlisted 
conscripts then started to decrease, and in 2011 it reached the same level as before the 
duration of service was reduced to 12 months, i.e. 135,00012. At that time, fewer than 
100,000 conscripts were sent to military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Feder-
ation, and the remainder ended up in other military formations (mainly the Internal Troops of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Meanwhile, more than 240,000 soldiers conscripted in the 
autumn of 2010 left the Russian army to become reservists. The significant one-off reduc-
tion of the number of conscripted soldiers only covered the Armed Forces units controlled 
by the Ministry of Defence, while in the remaining forces the numbers of conscripted sol-
diers remained unchanged. If the initial, partial information on the upcoming spring round 
of conscription (April-June 2012) is taken into account, it seems likely that the number 
of conscripts in this round will be similar to that in the autumn round, or no larger than in 
the spring 2011 round13. That would mean that in mid-2012, 200 to 280,000 conscripted 
soldiers will do their compulsory military service in the Russian Armed Forces (compared 
to 400,000 in mid-2011; see Appendix). According to the targets revealed in February for 
The changes to the structure 
of the officer cadre have contributed 
to the gradual disappearance 
of the previously widespread practice 
of manning senior NCO posts with 
junior NCOs, as a result of which 
it has de facto become necessary to 
create a professional cadre of NCOs 
in the Russian army.
7 Interfax-AVN, 15 February 
2012.
8 Среднедушевые денежные 
доходы по субъектам 
Российской Федерации 2009; 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/population/urov/
urov_11sub.htm
9 Interfax-AVN, 
26 January 2012.
10 TASS, 12 September 2011 
and later.
11 Ibid.
12 Interfax-AVN, 
10 January 2012.
13 Interfax-AVN, TASS, 
26 January 2012.
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the structure of the Russian army’s manning system, the number of conscripted soldiers 
in compulsory military service will decrease to 145,000 by 202014.
Reducing the number of conscripted soldiers has revealed the little-known fact that the of-
ficially published data on the numbers of soldiers in the Russian Armed Forces (1 million 
soldiers; see Appendix) refer not to the number of actually serving soldiers, but rather the 
number of posts in the Russian army (a similar situation occurred before the personnel 
reforms launched in 2008, and is typical of armies that continue to use conscription)15. 
Assuming that the current manning system remains in place, filling the vacant posts would 
require at least 300,000 soldiers to be drafted in the spring round in 2012, and that 
number would only cover the needs of the 
units controlled by the Ministry of Defence. 
Drafting such numbers of conscripts into 
military service seems unlikely, not only 
in the context of the above information 
and plans, but also because the army’s 
organisational capacity has been reduced 
as a result of downsizing the backup 
units. The Ministry of Defence and the 
government have categorically ruled out 
the idea of extending the duration of ba-
sic military service again (as a result of 
which fewer new conscripts would be 
needed)16, and in addition, the range of available legal options to defer or avoid military 
service was extended in 2010 and 201117. All this means that it should be considered 
a fact that the Russian army has started to move away from conscription as the main ele-
ment of its manning system.
The lower numbers of draftees, combined with the progressing liberalisation of the Russian 
laws on universal defence duty, have also changed the nature of conscription. A growing 
proportion of conscripts are university-educated, and even more importantly, specialists 
who have prepared themselves to serve in the army within the structures of the all-Russian 
paramilitary association DOSAAF, which has lately been operating increasingly effectively18. 
Both categories of conscripts in fact volunteer to do military service with future career pros-
pects in mind (including the option of becoming a contract soldier). As obtaining a deferral 
of military service is not difficult, the number of conscripts coerced into military service is 
decreasing. The reduced scope and changed nature of conscription have directly contrib-
uted to a decrease in cases of draft dodging and the incidence of dedovshchina (the bru-
talisation of new conscripts by those with greater seniority in service), which rises and falls 
in proportion to the number of conscripts drafted into service (a record number of cases 
of dedovshchina was reported in 2009–201019).
... for reasons unrelated to demographics
The number of conscripts is being reduced, even though a social and demographic sit-
uation in which a successful universal draft would be possible still prevails in Russia. 
An army could be maintained with the declared number of soldiers, i.e. one million, based 
primarily on conscription, irrespective of the demographic changes taking place. In 2011, 
11.6 million men of draft age (18–27) lived in Russia20, of which no more than 3.7 million 
had done compulsory military service in any of the country’s armed formations during the 
previous decade21. This means that nearly 8 million Russians have been available for draft. 
Even allowing for those who are exempted from or otherwise unable to do military service, 
14 TASS, 19 February 2012.
 
15 Interfax-AVN, 
12 January 2012.
 
16 Interfax-AVN, 22 December 
2011, 15 July 2011.
17 On the legal options to obtain 
exemption or deferral, see 
Interfax-AVN, 11 January 
2012, Interfax-AVN, 
13 October 2011 and 
15 July 2011, among others.
18 Aleksandr Pinchuk, ‘Армии 
нужны профессионалы, 
Красная звезда’ 
27 January 2012. 
http://nvo.ng.ru/news/2012-
01-27/2_recruits.html 
In 2010, DOSAAF trained 
84,000 future conscripts, 
and 110,000 in 2011. 
Interfax-AVN, 
29 September 2011.
19 TASS, 4 February 2012.
20 Calculated on the basis of 
‘Распределение населения 
по возрастным группам, 
Предположительная 
численность населения 
по Российской Федерации 
до 2030 года’; http://www.gks.
ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/
rosstatsite/main/population/
demography/
21 Calculated on the basis 
of the Russian President’s 
Decrees on draft into military 
service, see Appendix.
The idea to extend the duration 
of compulsory military service again 
has been rejected, and the range 
of available legal options to obtain 
an exemption from, or deferral 
of conscription has been extended 
systematically; this means that 
the Russian army has de facto started 
moving away from conscription as the 
main element of its manning system.
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usually for health-related reasons (around 30% of those reporting to the draft commissions 
each year are exempted or granted a deferral22, although considering the widespread cor-
ruption in the bodies in charge of organising conscription, it is difficult to say how many of 
them have genuine health issues), as well as the number of professional soldiers, manning 
the vacant military posts would not pose 
a problem. Russia will not experience 
a shortage of potential conscripts in the 
future, either. Irrespective of the negative 
demographic indicators, another 7 million 
young Russians will be available for the 
draft between 2011 and 202023. More-
over, the Russian Armed Forces will not 
even experience an increase in the number 
of soldiers of non-Russian nationalities. 
A comparison of figures in the recent cen-
suses shows that the proportion of those 
who consider themselves to be Russian in 
the Federation’s entire population has increased from 79.8% in 2002 to 80.9% in 2010, 
and the second largest group (around 5%) consists of citizens who do not claim any nation-
ality (they are referred to as Soviet people), and for whom Russian is their first language24. 
In view of the above, reducing the scale of conscription should be regarded as a result 
of a conscious and purposeful change to the manning system of the Armed Forces, rather 
than a situation necessitated by demographic factors.
Conclusions
Recently, a decision was taken in Russia to stop maintaining a mass army of the kind which 
would be useful if the country needed to directly defend its territory against a stronger external 
force, and to focus instead on creating a highly professionalised army similar to the leading 
Western armies. This presumably means that the country’s strategic nuclear forces are now 
deemed a sufficient deterrent, and that the conventional forces – the core of the Russian 
Armed Forces – are regarded primarily as a means to pursue Russian interests abroad.
It is highly likely that the objectives defined for the professionalisation of the Armed Forces 
will be achieved. This process is taking place in a favourable financial situation, while 
at the same time it is being necessitated by the changes already made to the structure of the 
officer cadre. It appears that the structural and organisational reform of the Russian army 
carried out in 2009–2010 has removed all the major obstacles to professionalisation.
The increasingly elitist nature of officer service in the Armed Forces will be conducive 
to the development of a new officer corps with higher qualifications and, in the case 
of cadet school graduates, a higher level of ideological motivation. The officer cadre will 
increasingly develop closer links with the power elite, but on the other hand it will become 
increasingly alienated from the rest of society.
Moving the centre of gravity of the Russian army’s manning system from conscription 
to contract service will considerably enhance the army’s professionalism, but at the same 
time, it will in the longer term undermine the Russian leadership’s ability to continue 
the current historical narrative, in which the tradition of the World War II-era mass Soviet 
army remains a basic constituent of the common identity of the Russian people.
22 Interfax-AVN, 30 September 
2011; TASS, 15 July 2011.
23 Calculated on the basis of 
‘Предположительная 
численность населения 
по Российской Федерации 
до 2030 года’, http://www.gks.
ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/
rosstatsite/main/population/
demography/
24 ‘Информационные материалы 
об окончательных итогах 
Всероссийской переписи 
населения 2010 года: 
Национальный состав 
населения Российской 
Федерации, Население 
Российской Федерации 
по владению языками’, 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/perepis2010/
perepis_itogi1612.htm 
Итоги Всероссийской 
переписи населения 2002 
Том 4, ‘Национальный 
состав и владение языками, 
гражданство’, 
http://www.perepis2002.ru/
index.html?id=17
Russia has reduced the scope 
of compulsory military service 
in a situation in which it would 
have been able to maintain an army 
based primarily on conscription. 
This means it was a conscious 
and purposeful change to 
the Armed Forces’ manning system, 
and not a decision necessitated 
by demographic factors.
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A P P e N d i X
1. The number of soldiers in the Russian Armed Forces in early 2012 (approximate figures)
Posts: 1 million
Soldiers actually serving (excluding students of officer schools and reserve soldiers in training): 700,000, of which:
- generals and officers: 220,000;
- non-commissioned officers and privates in contract service: 200,000;
- conscripted non-commissioned officers and privates: 280,000.
The Air Force, the Navy, the Airborne Troops, the Strategic Missile Troops and the Aerospace Defence Forces have high 
manning levels – more than 90% of posts are manned. Around 65% of posts are manned in the Ground Forces.
A large number of reserve soldiers (possibly totalling 100,000 for all Russia) are summoned each year to serve two 
months of training, often involving participation in military exercises. Unlike the draft figures, the exact numbers 
of reservists called for training are not disclosed.
2. Original and target numbers of officers (excluding posts in the Aerospace Defence Forces, the formation 
of which is to be completed in 2016), in thousands.
generals colonel lieutenant colonels majors captains
senior 
lieutenants 
and lieutenants
2008 1.1 25.6 87.6 99.5 90.4 51.0
2012 0.6 7.7 12.7 25.0 42.0 62.0
3. Numbers of conscripts drafted into service in the Russian army and the other military formations in Russia 
in the years 2002–2011 (before 2007 for 24 months, and since 2008 for 12 months), in thousands
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
spring 
round 161.7 175.0 166.0 157.7 124.5 133.5 133.2 305.5 270.6 218.7
autumn 
round 174.2 175.8 176.3 140.9 123.3 132.3 219.0 271.0 278.8 135.8
TOTAL 335.9 350.8 342.3 298.6 247.8 265.8 352.2 576.5 549.4 354.5
